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The Church is a free association; there is much to be gained by separation



    Footnote: "The Church is a free association; there is much to
    be gained by separation from it.  Conflict with error has no
    weapons other than thought and feeling.  One uniform type of
    doctrine has not yet been elaborated; divergencies in
    secondary matters arise freely in East and West; theology is
    not wedded to invariable formulas.  If in the midst of this
    diversity a mass of beliefs common to all is apparent, is one
    not justified in seeing in it, not a formulated system, framed
    by the representatives of pedantic authority, but faith itself
    in its surest instinct and its most spontaneous manifestation?
    If the same unanimity which is revealed in essential points of
    belief is found also in rejecting certain tendencies, are we
    not justified in concluding that these tendencies were in
    flagrant opposition to the fundamental principles of
    Christianity?  And will not this presumption be transformed
    into certainty if we recognize in the doctrine universally
    rejected by the Church the characteristic features of one of
    the religions of the past?  To say that gnosticism or
    ebionitism are legitimate forms of Christian thought, one must
    boldly deny the existence of Christian thought at all, or any
    specific character by which it could be recognized.  While
    ostensibly widening its realm, one undermines it.  No one in
    the time of Plato would lave ventured to give his name to a
    doctrine in which the theory of ideas had no place, and one
    would deservedly have excited the ridicule of Greece by trying
    to pass off Epicurus or Zeno as a disciple of the Academy.
    Let us recognize, then, that if a religion or a doctrine
    exists which is called Christianity, it may have its
    heresies."

The author's whole argument amounts to this: that every opinion
which differs from the code of dogmas we believe in at a given
time, is heresy.  But of course at any given time and place men
always believe in something or other; and this belief in
something, indefinite at any place, at some time, cannot be a
criterion of truth.

It all amounts to this: since ubi Christus ibi Ecclesia, then
Christus is where we are.

Every so-called heresy, regarding, as it does, its own creed as
the truth, can just as easily find in Church history a series of
illustrations of its own creed, can use all Pressensé's arguments
on its own behalf, and can call its own creed the one truly
Christian creed.  And that is just what all heresies do and have
always done.

The only definition of heresy (the word [GREEK WORD], means a
part) is this: the name given by a body of men to any opinion
which rejects a part of the Creed professed by that body.  The
more frequent meaning, more often ascribed to the word heresy, is
--that of an opinion which rejects the Church doctrine founded and
supported by the temporal authorities.

    [TRANSCRIBIST'S NOTE: The GREEK WORD above used Greek letters,
    spelled: alpha(followed by an apostrophe)-iota(with accent)-
    rho-epsilon-sigma-iota-zeta]

There is a remarkable and voluminous work, very little known,
"Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie," 1729, by Gottfried
Arnold, which deals with precisely this subject, and points out
all the unlawfulness, the arbitrariness, the senselessness, and
the cruelty of using the word heretic in the sense of reprobate.
This book is an attempt to write the history of Christianity in
the form of a history of heresy.

In the introduction the author propounds a series of questions:
(1) Of those who make heretics; (2) Of those whom they made
heretics; (3) Of heretical subjects themselves; (4) Of the method
of making heretics; and (5) Of the object and result of making
heretics.

On each of these points he propounds ten more questions, the
answers to which he gives later on from the works of well-known
theologians.  But he leaves the reader to draw for himself the
principal conclusion from the expositions in the whole book.  As
examples of these questions, in which the answers are to some
extent included also, I will quote the following. Under the 4th
head, of the manner in which heretics are made, he says, in one of
the questions (in the 7th):

   "Does not all history show that the greatest makers of
   heretics and masters of that craft were just these wise men,
   from whom the Father hid his secrets, that is, the hypocrites,
   the Pharisees, and lawyers, men utterly godless and perverted
   (Question 20-21)?  And in the corrupt times of Christianity
   were not these very men cast out, denounced by the hypocrites
   and envious, who were endowed by God with great gifts and who
   would in the days of pure Christianity have been held in high
   honor?  And, on the other hand, would not the men who, in the
   decline of Christianity raised themselves above all, and
   regarded themselves as the teachers of the purest Christianity,
   would not these very men, in the times of the apostles and
   disciples of Christ, have been regarded as the most shameless
   heretics and anti-Christians?"

He expounds, among other things in these questions, the theory
that any verbal expression of faith, such as was demanded by the
Church, and the departure from which was reckoned as heresy, could
never fully cover the exact religious ideas of a believer, and
that therefore the demand for an expression of faith in certain
words was ever productive of heresy, and he says, in Question 21:

   "And if heavenly things and thoughts present themselves to a
   man's mind as so great and so profound that he does not find
   corresponding words to express them, ought one to call him a
   heretic, because he cannot express his idea with perfect
   exactness?"

And in Question 33:

   "And is not the fact that there was no heresy in the earliest
   days due to the fact that the Christians did not judge one
   another by verbal expressions, but by deed and by heart, since
   they had perfect liberty to express their ideas without the
   dread of being called heretics; was it not the easiest and most
   ordinary ecclesiastical proceeding, if the clergy wanted to get
   rid of or to ruin anyone, for them to cast suspicion on the
   person's belief, and to throw a cloak of heresy upon him, and
   by this means to procure his condemnation and removal?

   "True though it may be that there were sins and errors among
   the so-called heretics, it is no less true and evident," he
   says farther on, "from the innumerable examples quoted here
   (i. e., in the history of the Church and of heresy), that there
   was not a single sincere and conscientious man of any
   importance whom the Churchmen would not from envy or other
   causes have ruined."

Thus, almost two hundred years ago, the real meaning of heresy was
understood.  And notwithstanding that, the same conception of it

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